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CLASSIFICATION OF CLAIMS IN DEBTOR PROCEEDINGS
A BANKRUPTCY court sits as a court of equity with full power to administer
assets according to the "principles and rules of equity jurisprudence."' In
straight bankruptcy proceedings this power is exercised by allowance or
disallowance or by subordination of claims against the bankrupt estate '-
in reorganizations and arrangements, by confirming or refusing to confirm
a plan, depending upon whether or not it is "fair, equitable and feasible."
3
The respective economic interests of the claimants have been the dominant
consideration, in equitable distribution of the debtor's assets. Creditors have
usually participated according to their priority, which is ascertained by their
1. Pepper v. Litton, 60 Sup. Ct. 238, 244 (U. S. 1939).
2. BANKRUPTCY AcT, § 57. The Bankruptcy Act is found in 52 SmAT. 840, 11 U. S.
C. §§ 1-1103 (Supp. 1938). The Act will be cited hereafter only by section numbzr.
3. This standard, developed in reorganization through equity receivership, is applied
in such proceedings, both state and federal, and in reorganization proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Act. It appears, for railroad reorganization, in § 77(e) (1) ; under Chapter X
for corporate reorganization, § 221(2); under Chapter XI for arrangements, § 365(3).
Similar provisions appear in § 75 and Chapters IX, XII and XIII. This Comment, howv-
ever, will consider only § 77 and Chapters X and XI as representative of the problem
of classification in reorganization proceedings.
881
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
economic status as measured in terms of their security or the preferential
treatment accorded them by law. In reorganization, the economic basis of
classification was written into the terms "fair and equitable" by the doctrine
of the Boyd case that junior economic interests cannot, ordinarily, participate
unless senior claims are satisfied.4 As a seldom-tested corollary to this strict
priority rule, there is the proposition that claims of the same economic status
should be treated equally.5
Equity has long recognized exceptions to the theory of strict economic
classification of claims. Such classification will be disregarded when fraud
is present. 6 And creditors' claims have been disapproved or subordinated on
the ground that the relationship of debtor and claimant made it inequitable
to apply the usual rule. This reason is invoked most frequently in the case of
dominant stockholders proving against their debtor corporations 7 or parent
corporations claiming against bankrupt subsidiaries.8 Recently, there has been
a tendency to broaden these exceptions with resulting breaches in the rule
that claims of the same economic class should be treated equally.
The importance of the power to classify interests can hardly be over-
emphasized. Subordination in the hierarchy of priorities may mean the
difference between payment and non-payment. Discrimination as to treat-
ment within one class may vitally affect the strategy of bargaining in the
reorganization process, or the distribution of political power in a reorgan-
ized company. Discrimination in favor of certain groups may also expedite
consummation of a plan. And inasmuch as each class votes separately, the
classification for voting purposes may mean the difference between success
and failure of proposed reorganizations or arrangements.
The nature of classification differs somewhat in each branch of insolvency
law. In a straight bankruptcy proceeding, classification is a question only
of order of payment from the bankrupt estate, and action against a claim
will take either the form of disallowance or subordination. The latter is a
form of classification, accomplished by placing a secured claim in the status
of an unsecured claim, or by placing a claim, secured or unsecured, in a
separate class to receive payment only after other creditors have been satis-
4. Northern P. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913), reaffirmed recently in Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1939).
5. See 2 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) 1682; FINLFTrER, TnE LAW
OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION (1939) 465; MOORE'S BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1939)
584. Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483 (1919).
6. See Pepper v. Litton, 60 Sup. Ct. 238 (U. S. 1939) for an example of disallow-
ance because of pronouncedly fraudulent circumstances. See GILBER's COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY (1937) 963.
7. In re Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co., 71 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934), cert. de-
ied, 293 U. S. 612 (1934) ; Alexander v. Theleman, 69 F. (2d) 610 (C. C. A. 10th,
1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 581 (1934) ; In re Chas. K. Horton, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 905
(S. D. Tex. 1938).
8. See Rembar, Claims Against Affiliated Companies in Reorganization (1939) 39
COL. L. REV. 907; Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1471.
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fled.9 Inasmuch as this latter type of subordination has occurred principally
where the creditor was a proprietor of the debtor, 10 the difference between
subordination and disallowance has been slight. A principal stockholder who
must wait until other creditors are paid receives any residue either as creditor
or, assuming practically complete ownership, as debtor receiving the un-
claimed balance.-' And if there is no balance after payment of all other
creditors, the subordinated claimant might just as well have had his claim
disallowed. Subordination may, however, make a considerable difference if
the equitable power of classification is expanded to permit discrimination
against claimants other than the dominating proprietor of the bankrupt.
Suppose, for example, that a bank creditor in an effort to protect its advances
forced a debtor into unwise business practices resulting in diminution of assets.
A bankruptcy court might well subordinate the bank's claims on the theory
that equity should not protect a creditor who has jeopardized the interests
of other creditors.' 2 If this were done, there would be a marked departure
from the usual order of strict economic priority.
In corporate reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the
power to classify is specifically granted by the statute. Section 197 provides
that "for the purposes of the plan and its acceptance, the judge shall fix the
division of creditors and stockholders into classes according to the nature
of their respective claims and stock." Some commentators have expressed
the opinion that classification under this section should be purely on grounds
of economic priority.' 3 There are indications, however, that courts may be
willing, at the time of classification, to go much further, and alter economic
precedence by exercising their equitable power of subordination. In Taylor
v. Standard Gas and Elcctric Conpqan,,14 the Supreme Court rejected a
proposed plan under Section 77B 5 because the unsecured claim of Standard,
9. For a case in which both secured and unsecured claims were subordinated, see
In re Chas. K. Horton, Inc.. 22 F. Supp. 905 (S. D. Tex. 1938). For subordination of
unsecured claims, see Henry v. Dolley, 99 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 10th, 193); In re Otse-
go Waxed Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W. D. Mich. 1935).
10. Henry v. Dolley, 99 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938) (parent and subsidiary);
in re Otsego Waxed Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W. D. Mich. 1935) (same); In re Chas.
K. Horton, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 905 (S. D. Tex. 1938) (president and principal stockholder).
11. See § 66(b). Whether or not a subordinated creditor could vote under § 56, which
provides that creditors shall vote on matters submitted to them, is apparently an unan-
swered question. Equitable grounds for subordination might equally be considered grounds
for forbidding voting at creditors' meetings.
12. This does not seem to be a very great step beyond Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939), where the parent's claim was subordinated partly
because of mismanagement of its subsidiary.
13. See 2 GEmm, CoRporATE REoRGANIZATioNs (1936) 1602; FiNx-L=n , Tn Lw
OF BAxNRulrc- REORGANIZATION (1939) 465. Cf. Friendly, Some Comments on the Cor-
porate Reorganizations Act (1934) 48 HI-v. L. REv. 39, 70-74.
14. 306 U. S. 307 (1939).
15. Chapter X which supersedes § 77B does not differ materially so far as classifica-
tion is concerned.
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parent of the debtor subsidiary, should have been subordinated to the rights
of the preferred stockholders of the subsidiary. The Court's reasoning has
been characterized as based upon "the equities of the case- the history of
spoliation, mismanagement, and faithless stewardship of the affairs of the
subsidiary . . . to the detriment of the public investors [of the subsidiary] ;,"1
upon these grounds the Court decreed subordination, though expressly declin-
ing to disallow the claim altogether. While the disapproval of the classifica-
tion appeared only at the stage of confirmation of the plan, there is no
apparent reason for not determining the equities of the case at the earlier
stage when classification takes place.1 7 If this can be done, then clearly
the power to classify includes the power to subordinate.' 8
Even within a single group having like economic standing, there are indi-
cations that by classification separate interests may be placed in two or more
classes for different treatment. In In re Burns Brothers,'0 a district court
confirmed a plan under Section 77B which provided that unsecured creditors
should be divided into two classes, one consisting of two very large creditors
who had exercised considerable control over the debtor, the other consisting
of small creditors whose total claims amounted to only slightly more than
five per cent of the total unsecured claims. Prior to drafting of the plan
there had been a heated contest as to the liability of the dominant creditors
for alleged mismanagement of the debtor. The contest ended in a compromise
plan in which preferred treatment was given to the smaller claims. There
may be other ways in which a single economic group can be divided into
classes, and the resulting classes treated differently. Sometimes the treatment
of such groups is meant to be comparable, or "equal," though different, as
where holders of debentures, as investors, are given debts of longer maturity
than the claims given merchandise creditors ;20 on other occasions the treat-
ment afforded such classes is discriminatory,2 1 and various reasons are sug-
gested to explain the fairness of the result. Thus, a court would appear
16. See Pepper v. Litton, 60 Sup. Ct. 238, 246 (U. S. 1939). The Court in the Pepper
case was emphasizing one aspect of the case. It should also be pointed out that the
debtor, almost wholly owned by Standard, was insufficiently capitalized. The parent's
claim was one on open account, accumulated over a period of ten years of very close
supervision and control which involved large management fees, a one-sided lease forced
on the debtor, and other transactions mainly in the interests of the parent. See Rembar,
mupra note 8, at 923 et seq.
17. But cf. In re Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 11 F. Supp. 865 (E. D. Pa. 1935),
where the court refused to consider preliminary objections to the size of a claim and ten-
tatively allowed it for voting purposes.
18. See Pepper v. Litton, 60 Sup. Ct. 238, 246 (U. S. 1939) ("... the bankruptcy
court has the power to sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injus-
tice or unfairness is not done . . .").
19. 14 F. Supp. 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
20. Cf. In re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1935).
21. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 89 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A.
5th, 1937).
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justified in permitting discrimination, either because on the facts of the case
the group receiving less is not equitably entitled to more,2 or because the
differential is not sufficiently unfair to offset the advantages of effectuating
a plan based on a compromise.2 These settlements may not often be con-
tested. Splitting off a group of claims in one class is usually dictated by a
desire to placate a dissentient minority by favored treatment. As a practical
matter, the remaining members of the class will probably not object.
A situation the converse of separation within a single economic group is
one where technically separate classes are combined. Each creditor with a
distinct security ordinarily forms a separate class.2-4 But in In re Palisades-
on-the-Desplahzes,25 the court placed all certificate holders in one class despite
the fact that each one was secured by a separate mortgage on a specific piece
of land. The fact that differences in the securities were not considered sub-
stantial led the court to exercise what it deemed a broad discretion conferred
by the classification provision. 0 Combination of substantially similar though
technically different claims seems quite advisable where separation would
greatly increase the number of classes.27
In addition to classification as to treatment, claimants must be grouped
for voting purposes. Obviously, each economic group votes separately,2
subject to the qualification discussed under the Palisades case, where the
combined secured creditors would vote as one class. - On the other hand,
where creditors of the same economic status are classified separately for
treatment in the plan, separate voting is in order50 An interesting question
might arise in this latter situation. In a case where the classification is to
favor a minority by special treatment, the favored minority might seek to
22. Cf. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 305 U. S. 307 (1939). The plan in
In re Burns Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) appears partly to have depended
on equities, partly on compromise.
23. See In re Burns Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
24. See 2 GERDES. CORPORATE- REORG ANIZATION (1Q36) 162.
25. 89 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937). The case arose under § 77B, but differences
are not material.
26. The court also considered important the fact that the one objecting creditor who
appealed stood to gain from the plan because the value of his security was considerably
less than the probable value of the payments received under the plan. Briggle, D. J.
dissented on the grounds that the classification Awas unconstitutional. Id. at 218.
27. Cf. J. P. Mforgan & Co. v. Missouri P. R. R., S5 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. Sth,
1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 604 (1936) (See notes 45 and 46 infra and accmanying
text).
28. See § 197, quoted supra p. 83.
29. In In re Palisades-on-the-Desplaines, 39 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), the vot-
ing was by the certificate holders acting as a unit.
30. Separate voting occurred in In re Burns Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S. D. N. Y.
1936) discussed mspra p. 834. See also Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp.,
89 F. (2d) 333, 338 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), where the court affirmed a plan providing dif-
ferent treatment for two different groups of common stockholders but noted that the
stockholders should have voted separately.
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increase its advantage by threatening to block the plan. In that event, the
court could either fall back on Section 197, relying on the "nature" of the
claims to put them into one class,3 ' or disfranchise the minority under Section
20332 on the ground that its refusal to accept was not in good faith.
3 3
A cognate problem may arise where for equitable reasons the court either
subordinates as to priority or classifies specifically for discriminatory treat-
ment. The interests thus affected may well be opposed to all plans. In the
Taylor case,34 for example, the parent corporation might well attempt to
block any plan drawn in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court.35
But if the plan proposed is clearly fair on the basis of the holding of the
prior case, the judge might disfranchise the objecting parent.3 " Or he might
under Section 17937 force the plan on the dissenting class. Obstructionist
tactics arising out of classification can thus undoubtedly be forestalled.
Another problem of classification for voting purposes remains. In an
English case, under a reorganization comparable to one which might arise
under Chapter X, unsecured creditors receiving equal treatment were classi-
fied separately for voting purposes on the ground that one group of creditors,
by virtue of a special guarantee of full payment by directors of the debtor,
had a different interest in the outcome of the reorganization." It seems
probable that such a situation, were it to come up under Chapter X, might
31. There is an apparent conceptual difficulty in permitting classification of unsecured
claims for purposes of treatment but denying it for voting. In the absence of objection
by creditors who stand to lose by the paradoxical treatment, however, there is no diffi-
culty in sustaining the action on equitable grounds. Objection by the losing group is not,
as pointed out in the text, a likely event.
32. Section 203 provides: "If the acceptance or failure to accept a plan by the holder
of any claim or stock is not in good faith, in the light of or irrespective of the time of
acquisition thereof, the judge may, . . . direct that such claim or stock be disqualified
for the purpose of determining the requisite majority for the acceptance of a plan."
33. In view of the wording to the effect that good faith is to be considered "in the
light of . . . [the] acquisition" it may be that good faith is limited to the mode and pur-
pose of acquisition. Cf. Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F.
(2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 679 (1937). But according to the
authors of Chapter X, such a strict interpretation was probably not intended. See Mooim's
BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1939) 532.
34. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939). See p. 883 supra.
35. In a situation where the debtor was insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, possibly
not the fact in the Taylor case, the controlling parent probably would not obstruct the
plan because in bankruptcy he might find his claim disallowed or subordinated for the
same reason it was subordinated by the Court in the Taylor case. See Pepper v. Litton,
60 Sup. Ct. 238, 246 (U. S. 1939).
36. See § 203, note 32 supra.
37. Briefly, § 179 permits the judge to confirm a plan either upon the assent of suit-
able majorities or upon provision for dissenting classes of creditors and stockholders tin-
der §216(7), (8). 'Under §216(7) (d), and § 216(8) (c), any method which, under the
circumstances of the case, "equitably and fairly" protects the dissenting group is accept-
able. See Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 116.
38. La Laini~re de Roubaix v. Glen Glove & Hosiery Co., [1926] Sess. Cas. 91.
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be similarly treated for purposes of classification. This could be done in
either of two ways. The court might urge, under the classification section,' 9
that the creditors protected by the suretyship obligations should be required
to vote separately whether or not they were treated differently, on the ground
that their economic stake in the reorganization differed from that of other
unsecured creditors, and that they would be more willing than other creditors
to accept a sacrifice under the plan. This position has been contested, ap-
parently on the theory that the scheme of the Bankruptcy Act requires equal
treatment for all persons classed by the Act as creditors of equal rank.40
But equality of treatment should not necessarily imply equality of voting
rights. The court should, in the exercise of its equitable powers, be able
to assure itself that the vote on any plan reflects the judgment of the parties,
based on full disclosure of the facts.41 The same result might also he reached
under the section allowing disfranchisement, 42 on the ground that a vote in
favor of a plan by one whose financial interest in the outcome was augmented
by the appeal of additional surety is a vote "not in good faith." Even if the
court fails to do this, it is always empowered to disapprove the plan because
it is not "fair and equitable," in that too little is given the non-guaranteed
class, perhaps because of an inequitable distribution of voting power.
In other fields of bankruptcy, the statutory authority of the court to
classify claims differs somewhat from that conferred by Chapter X. In rail-
road reorganization, the division of creditors and stockholders "shall not
provide for separate classification unless there be substantial differences in
priorities, claims, or interests."' 43 This qualification was added to obviate the
difficulty of handling the large number of classes created by the complicated
debt structures of large railroads.4 4 The limitation has been construed to
require creditors with short-term promissory notes, each secured by different
collateral, to be combined in one class. 45 There are dicta in the same case
seemingly outlawing classification on the basis of bias or difference of interest
in the outcome.
46
The provision probably does not, however, preclude the court from altering
relationships by classification where equity seems to demand discrimination.
39. Section 197. See p. 883 supra.
40. See FI-LE-TER, THE LAW OF BANKUzrcv, REorGA-azATIox (1939) 40. Cf.
Friendly, Some Comnents on the Corporate Reorganirations Act (1934) 48 HAnv. L Rm.
39, 71, n. 123.
41. See Kullman v. Greenebaum, 92 Cal. 403, 28 Pac. 674 (IS91). Cf. National
Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426, 437 (1933).
42. Section 203. See note 32 supra.
43. Section 77(c) (7).
44. See Craven and Fuller, The 1035 Amnendmnents of the Railroad Bankruptcy Lawo
(1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1254, 1265-67.
45. J. P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri P. R. R., 85 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936),
cert. denied, 299 U. S. 604 (1936).
46. Id. at 352.
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Unconscionable participation by a parent railroad in its mismanaged sub-
sidiary seems subject to equity's scrutiny regardless of the extent of the
judge's statutory power to classify.47 Nor is it probable that the provision
precludes subdivision of one economic group for purposes of different treat-
ment. If a proposed plan meets the required test of being "fair and equit-
able," 48 the fact that within one class different treatment is given should
not void the plan. Otherwise, consummation of the plan, the primary ob-
jective of a reorganization, might be delayed because such a strict interpreta-
tion of the classification provision would preclude compromises. Furthermore,
the need for permitting different treatment becomes greater when, by virtue
of the classification provision, classes must be decreased in number and
increased in size, thus throwing together what may be substantially similar
economic claims but substantially dissimilar interests. Harmony within a
class may be possible only by subdivision under the proposed plan.
Once separate treatment is accorded, separate voting would in all likeli-
hood follow. But the judge could probably refuse to do so, and require all
"classes" of the same economic interest to vote as a unit if there were indi-
cations that a separate group within one economic class might, were it
allowed to vote separately, try to block the plan.49 In any event, the judge
has power, as under Chapter X, to force a plan on a dissenting class.50
Under Chapter XI, which provides for both individual and corporate
arrangements, classification is within one single economic group, owing to
the fact that neither secured claims nor perhaps equities in the debtor are
affected.51 But within the class of unsecured claims, classification is con-
templated. Section 351 provides that "for the purposes of the arrangement
and its acceptance, the court may fix the division of creditors into classes."
There is obviously no question of the court's power to classify under Chapter
XI. Rather the question is what limitations the court can impose on division
into classes. In one of the first cases arising under this chapter, In re United
States Realty and Improvement Company, 5 2 the proposed plan divided un-
secured claims into two "classes," 53 claims to be modified, and claims to be
left unchanged. On the facts of the case, doubts exist whether the plan could
47. There is no reason to believe that the Taylor case [see p. 883 supra] would have
been differently decided had it involved the reorganization of a railroad.
48. Section 77(e) (1).
49. The situation would be identical with that presented under Chapter X. See p.
885 mspra.
50. Section 77(e). For a discussion of the problems related to this power, see
MOORE'S BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1939) 371-385.
51. Section 356. With reference to stock equities under Chapter XI, see the dissent
of Judge Clark in In re United States Realty & Improvement Co., C. C. A. 2d, Jan. 15,
1940.
52. C. C. A. 2d, Jan. 15, 1940. See (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 927.
53. Quotation marks are used because for the purposes of the plan and voting, there
is only one class, the affected group. Actually, there has been a division into "classes."
[Vol. 49 : 881
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be confirmed as one which was "fair and equitable and feasible."5' But that
question was left until the plan should come up for confirmation ris In view
of the fact that a plan might be discriminatory and therefore "unfair" to
the creditors in the affected class,5G it might seem appropriate to question
and correct the classification immediately as an unreasonable one.5 7 Under
ordinary circumstances "equality is equity,"' s and good reasons should exist
for disregarding equal status. Power to do equity by classifying would seem
to encompass refusal to divide as well as authority to divide. 9
The preceding example is undoubtedly an extreme one of discrimination
among unsecured creditors. The more likely classification under Chapter XI
would be division into large and small creditors, the latter to be paid off
in full in order to save the administrative costs of keeping them in the proceed-
ing as claimants.00 Compromise of disputed claims may appear by different
treatment under a plan.0 ' It is also quite possible for the court to admit a
claim as bona fide but inequitable - for example, the claim of an over-
reaching dominant stockholder- and to announce that no plan would be
approved which did not discriminate against the inequitable claim.02 Any
54. Controversy exists over the import of these words in Chapter XI. See Rostow
and Cutler, Competing Systems of Rcorgqanirzation: Chapters X and XI of the Banhrupt-
cy Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334, 1352-1362; (1940) 49 Yam L. J. 927, 930.
55. Perhaps the question must be left until confirmation. Under § 363 it appears that
only the debtor can propose a modification of a plan. If re-classification under § 351 is a
modification, then the judge might have to exercise his power by refusing confirmation.
56. See (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 927, 931.
57. It ,.as assumed by the authors of the bill that the classification would have to b2
reasonable. See NfooiR's BA.kNKRPTCY -MANUAL (1939) 665.
58. See note 5 supra.
59. Cf. In re Ogden Apartment Bldg. Corp., 90 F. (2d) 712,715 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937),
where the court held that a holder of a claim based on a void tax deed should be classed
with holders of first mortgage bonds, saying: "Appellant cannot object to this classifi-
cation rather than a separate classification since if it were allowed the latter, it would
have to be in subordination to the bondholders, and . . . subordination of its claim would
render its consent to the plan unnecessary. ....
60. Cf. Brockett v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co.. 81 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936),
where the court did not object to having unsecured creditors paid in full and secured
creditors take a loss. The reason given was that unsecured claims formed a small frac-
tion of the total debt.
In addition to the small-large classification, the draftsmen of the bill suggested classi-
fying bank creditors and merchandise creditors separately for different treatment. See
_MooRE's BANIMUPTCY MAINUAL (1939) 665. If by different treatment is meant only the
method in which the two classes are satisfied, and not unequal treatment, the draftsmen
were undoubtedly right. Cf. § 357(1). But in the absence of a dispute over the size of a
claim or some inequity in equal treatment [see bank creditor example, supra p. 883], it
is difficult to see how one group could be given less in amount than the other.
61. In re Bums Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) is a § 77B case involving
a compromise among unsecured creditors resulting in unequal treatment.
62. If no satisfactory plan is accepted, the court apparently must dismiss the pro-
ceedings because there is no provision allowing him to force a plan on dissenters. See
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other inequitable situation, such as one where the arrangement leaves mis-
managing stock interests in control or does not affect a disputed secured
claim, manifestly cannot be rectified by classification tinder Chapter XI. Cor-
rection must depend on the effect to be given the power of the court to refuse
confirmation because the plan is not "fair and equitable and feasible."03
The power to effect equitable distribution of assets in debtor proceedings
through classification, though not yet greatly developed, gives every indication
of becoming a strong weapon in the bands of bankruptcy courts. Although
the practice of classification on all sorts of grounds which may be deenied
equitable violates the mechanical terms of the rule of strict contractual priority
represented by the Boyd case, in fact it complements that rule. Both the
rule of the Boyd case and the body of cases concerned with classification are
attempts to settle the sometimes complicated claims and counterclaims of a
debtor proceeding in a manner which judges regard as equitable. In the
absence of special, ad hoc factors of over-reaching or fraud, the rule-of-thumb
stated in the Boyd case and its successors works well enough - claims are
met in the order of their contractual priority, and within each level of the
hierarchy, equal "pro rata" distribution obtains. But when rigid adherence
is unjust, either because it restricts unduly the give-and-take of compromise
or unjustly favors those whose actions do not entitle them to equality, the
discretionary power of classification can smooth out inequities. In the last
analysis, the priority rule and its corollary of equal treatment within a single
economic group are based on the doctrine that to enforce contract rights is
to do equity. Deference to contract rights when the result is manifestly unfair
to some junior interest or unfairly distributes political power in the reor-
ganization process would make the conduct of reorganization proceedings
too mechanical. The power to classify will, in many instances, afford a flexible
method by which a court can, when necessary, accommodate the priority rule
to the practical considerations of reorganization.
note 37 supra. Under § 361 the court can disqualify votes for acceptance which are not
in good faith. Cf. In re Weintrob, 240 Fed. 532 (E. D. N. C. 1917) (under old § 12).
But it does not appear to be given authority to disqualify dissenters.
63. See § 366(3). For the difficulties connected with making "fair and equitable" the
same powerful weapon in the hands of a judge that it is under Chapter X, see Rostow
and Cutler, supra note 54, at 1352-1362.
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